CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents the theories based on the problems. It concern about Illocutionary speech act used by students of *English Department'11* in their Facebook conversation.

A.   Speech Act

A speech act is an utterance that serves a function in communication. We perform speech acts when we offer an apology, greeting, order, promise, congratulate, request, complaint, invitation, compliment, thank or refusal. A speech act might contain just one word, as in "I am promise!" to perform a promise, or several words or sentences: "I'm sorry I forgot your birthday". Speech acts include real-life interactions and require not only knowledge of the language but also appropriate use of that language within a given culture. [8]

Speech act theory was proposed by J. L. Austin and has been developed by J. R. Searle. They believe that language is not only used to inform or to describe things, it is often used to "do things", to perform acts. Ex. (1) You're fired. Actions performed via utterances are generally called speech acts, the uttering of the relevant words is the action itself; without the utterance the action is not done. These are called performative sentences and the verbs used are called

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[8] Ibid

performative verbs.[9] Speech Act theory was developed from the basic belief that language is used to perform actions.The meaning and action are related to language. They apply to the speaker's communicative intention in producing an utterance. The speaker - expects that his/her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer.

B.   Speech Act theory by Sadock

People use language to achieve a variety of functions like expressing different emotions, give argument or even insult someonewhen they speak.The theory of speech acts is especially concerned with those acts that are not completely covered under one or more of the major divisions of grammar—phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics—or under some general theory of actions. We can do all sorts of things, from aspirating a consonant, to constructing a relative clause, to insulting a guest, to starting a warwhen we speak. These are all, pre-theoretically, speech acts—acts done in the process of speaking.[10]

Speech act is not completely described in grammar, when we request something by uttering an imperative sentence or greet someone by saying, "please!" Thus, there is clearly a conventional aspect to the study of speech acts. Sometimes, the achievement cannot be so directly tied to convention, as when we thank a guest by saying, "I like strawberry." There is no effect that stating that one

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[9]Martin. (2009). After New Media: everywhere and always on. In G. Creeber, & R. Martin (Eds.), Digital cultures. Understanding new media(pp. 157-169). New York: McGraw Hill Open University Press.

[10] http://hum.uchicago.edu/ck0/kennedy/classes/f07/pragmatics/sadock.pdf

loves strawberry counts as an act of thanking. In this case, the speaker's intention in making the utterance and a recognition by the addressee of that intention under the conditions of utterance clearly plays an important role.

According to Sadock, when people communicate, the basic communication framework 'simultaneously' consists of three types of speech acts.[11]

A. *Locutionary act*: It means that certain sounds are produced that comprise identifiable words, arranged on the basis of a particular grammar and has a certain sense and reference.

B. *Illocutionary act*: 'This is the conventional force associated with the uttering of the words in a particular context.'

C. *Perlocutionary act*: This refers to the effects the utterance has on the hearer.

C.   Austin's Theory

The writer used theory speech act by Austin. According to Austin's, the idea of an "illocutionary act" can be captured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we *do* something", as when someone issues an order to someone to go by saying "Go!", or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife." An interesting type of illocutionary speech act is that performed in the utterance of what Austin calls performatives, in contrast to what he called constatives, the descriptive sentences that until Austin were the principal   concern   of   philosophers   of   language—sentences   that   seem,

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[11] Thomas hurka, "the use apologize speech act realization", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 3 (September 1982) 50.

pretheoretically, at least, to be employed mainly for saying something rather than doing something.[12] Performatives means perform an actions, e.g. I apologize.

Locutions, Illocutions, and Perlocutions

Austin substituted a three-way contrast among the kinds of acts that are performed when language is put to use, namely the distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, all of which are characteristic of most utterances, including standard examples of both performatives and constatives.[13]

Locutionary Acts, according to Austin, this is the act of simply uttering a sentence from a language. It is a description of what the speaker says.

Illocutionary Acts, this is what the speaker does in uttering a sentence. Illocutionary acts include such as stating, requesting, ordering.

The third of Austin's categories of acts is the Perlocutionary Act, the effect of an illocutionary act upon the hearer.

Austin classifies illocutionary acts into five types, i.e., verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives.[14]Austin classify to give a general picture of illocutionary acts: what types of illocutionary act one can generally perform in uttering a sentence.

a. Verdictive

acts that consist of delivering a finding.It can be observed when juries, mediators, for instance, are giving a verdict, exercise judgment.

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[12]Etsuko Oishi, Esercizi Filosofici 1, 2006, pp. 1-14 ISSN 1970-0164
[13] Etsuko Oishi, Esercizi Filosofici 1, 2006, pp. 1-14 ISSN 1970-0164
[14]Ibid

b. Exercitives

acts of giving a decision for or against a course of action, e.g.,appoint, dismiss, related to executions of right, authority, and influence, order or designate, exert influence or exercise power.

c. Commissives

commits a speaker to some future action, e.g., contract, give one's word, declare one's intention, promise or intend, assume obligation or declare intention.

d. Behabitives

expressions of attitudes toward the conduct, fortunes or attitudes of others, e.g., apologize, thank, congratulate, welcome, concerned with attitudes and social behaviors.

e. Expositives

acts of expounding of views, conducting of arguments, and clarifying,deny, inform, concede, refer.

The long list of illocutionary verbs in each class also illustrates how many subtly differentiated illocutionary acts exist in a language like English. The fact that Austin includes the same word in two different classes and he does not regard it as a problem suggests that it is not an issue for Austin which class a particular illocutionary verb/act actually belongs to. The importance of introducing this classification of illocutionary acts is rather to explicate, as we explained above, what type of illocutionary act one can generally perform by uttering a sentence;

and, with additional specifications, how much more diversified illocutionary acts are than we are usually aware of.

D. Searle's Theory

Searle, a work that is second only to Austin's in its influence on speech act theory, presents a neo-Austinian analysis in which convention once again looms large. Searle argued that such an account is incomplete because 1) it fails to distinguish communication that proceeds by using meanings of the kind that only natural languages make available, and 2) it fails to distinguish between acts that succeed solely by means of getting the addressee to recognize the speaker's intention to achieve a certain (perlocutionary) effect and those for which and those for which that recognition is "...in virtue of (by means of) H[earer]'s knowledge of (certain of) the rules governing (the elements of) [the uttered sentence] T." These Searle labels Illocutionary Effects.

Of the various locutionary acts that Austin mentions, Searle singled out the Propositional Act as especially important. This in turn consists of two components, a Referential Act, in which a speaker picks out or identifies a particular object through the use of a definite noun phrase, and a Predication, which Searle did not see as a separate locutionary act (or any other kind of speech act) but only as a component of the total speech act, i.e. the combination of illocutionary force with propositional content.

Searle categorizes speech acts according to their illocutionary purpose (i.e) what the speaker is doing with the utterance, how they fit in the world, their

expressed psychological state, and their propositional content. For the current research the taxonomy presented by Searle because it is comprehensive. According to Searle, there are some categories of illocutionary speech acts.[15]

a. Assertive acts

An assertive act counts as an attempt to explain the actual state of affairs comprising phrases used to address a specific idea, proposition or belief. These acts include asserting, concluding, informing, predicting and reporting.

b. Directive acts

These are employed to get the addressee to do something. For instance, commands, orders, requests and suggestions.

c. Commisive Acts

In these acts the speakers commit themselves to future actions. The act can be a promise, a simple statement but the function is that the person is committed to the statement s/he has given. The intention behind commisive acts is that of offering, promising, refusing, vowing and volunteering.

d. Expressive Acts

These speech acts state what the speaker feels, his/her psychological state. These can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy or sorrow.

e. Declarative

Declarative acts are statements or expressions that change the world by their utterance, for example a minister saying now I pronounce you husband and

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[15]Ibid

wife and the judge saying, the court sentences you to ten years imprisonment.

f. Quotations

These statements refer to the speech acts which the addressor has not originally produced. These could be motivational, inspirational, life quotes.

g. Poetic verses

This speech act is not a part of the taxonomy given beforehand and is included because it is the need of data categorizations. These express a variety of emotions from joy to sadness, love, loneliness.

A central part of Searle's program is the idea that "speaking a language is performing acts according to rules", where by "rule" he means a conventional association between a certain kind of act and its socially determined consequences. To perform an illocutionary act, according to Searle, is to follow certain conventional rules that are constitutive of that kind of act. In order to discover the rules, Searle, following Austin, proposed to examine the conditions that must obtain for an illocutionary act to be felicitously performed. For each such condition on the felicitous performance of the act in question, he proposed that there is a rule to the effect that the IFIDS should only be uttered if that felicity condition is satisfied. The project was carried out in detail for promises, a kind of illocution that Searle described as "fairly formal and well articulated," and from which "many of the lessons learned ... are of general application." For the illocutionary act of promising, the rules that he postulated are[16]:

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[16] Ibid

1. Pr (the IFIDS for promising) is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) T the utterance of which predicates some future act A of S.

2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A.

3. Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.

4. Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A.

5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.

Two further features of Searle's theory deserve mention. First, he accepted Austin's idea that a sufficient test for illocutionary acts is that they could have been performed by uttering an explicit performative. Thus, he said that more than one illocutionary act can be accomplished by the utterance of a single, noncompound sentence, giving as an example the case of a wife who says at a party, "It's really quite late," and in doing so simultaneously performs the illocutionary act of stating a fact and the illocutionary act of making a suggestion equivalent to "I suggest that we go home." Elsewhere, Searle suggested that illocutionary acts can be cascaded, so to speak. Making a particular utterance may immediately accomplish one illocutionary act, e.g., stating something, which act, having been accomplished, may result in the accomplishment of a corollary illocutionary act, e.g., warning. Second, he observed that an illocutionary act is typically performed with a certain perlocutionary effect in mind, an effect that

follows from the essential condition: "Thus requesting is, as a matter of its essential condition, an attempt to get the hearer to do something ..." Searle doubted that a reduction of illocutions to associated perlocutionary effects could be accomplished, but Austin's worry about the distinction between these two categories is highlighted by this possibility.

E. StrawsonRedux: Bach & Harnish (1979)

Bach & Harnish completely rejected Searle's program for making constitutive rules central, and proposed to substitute a carefully worked out version of Strawson's earlier, intention-centered theory. They followed Strawson in distinguishing between ceremonial acts like christening and marrying, for which convention is taken to be the primary illocutionary mechanism, and the case of non-ceremonial acts like asking and stating, which they label Communicative, and for which they assume that intention is crucial to the accomplishment of the illocutionary act. Their contribution was three-fold:

1) to suggest a very general Speech Act Schema (SAS) for communicative illocutionary acts,

2) to show how inferences based on Mutual Contextual Beliefs (MCBs) play a role in communicative speech acts, and

3) to make detailed use of Grice's notion of conversational implicature in fleshing out the theory.

F.   Previous Studies

In conducting the research, the researcher also pays attention to a considerable previous study.

SanaaIlyas, Dr. QamarKhushi. Facebook Status Updates: A Speech Act Analysis, 2012. The results revealed that status messages were most frequently constructed with expressive speech acts, assertives and directives. In addition, a new category of poetic verses was also found in the data. The findings also showed that various socialization patterns emerge through the sharing of feelings, information and ideas.[17]

Jessica Lee Pugh, A Qualitative Study OfThe Facebook Socialnetwork: The Desire To Influence, Associate, And Construct A Representative And Ideal Identity, 2010. This study extends prior research of computer-mediated environments (personal Websites) to develop theory of how people contemporarily define themselves in their social online space. As a result, the strong and weak network ties develop mutual relationships of self-esteem, a sense of belonging, and support on Facebook. In anonline environment, Facebook users are driven to the site to employ their influence, ignite their curiosity, and seek adventure as they communicate and learn from their networks. In this interactive experience users have been able to share more than ever before, and will continue to improve online communications by making online identities more intertwined and reflective of real-life relationships.[18]

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[17]SanaaIlyas, Dr. QamarKhushi, Facebook Status Updates: A Speech Act Analysis, ISSN-L: 2223-9553, ISSN: 2223-9944 Vol. 3, No. 2, September 2012
[18]Jessica Lee Pugh, A Qualitative Study Of The Facebook Socialnetwork: The Desire To Influence, Associate, And Construct A Representative And IdealIdentity, May 2010.

Scott Appling, Erica J. Briscoe, Heather Hayes, andRudolph L. Mappus, Towards Automated Personality IdentificationUsing Speech Acts.The result, when Conscientiousness was regressed onto the speech acts, the only significant finding was that it negativelypredicted Assertives (β=-.026; p<.05). Neuroticism was negatively associated with Commissives (β=-.028; p<.05). Agreeableness was negatively associated with Assertives(β=-.091; p<.01). Extraversion predicted Assertives (β=-.053; p<.01). Openness did not significantly predict any speech act. Thus, Assertives was the most prevalent speech act across most personalitytraits.[19]

Nguyen Van Han, Contrast and Critique of Two Approaches to Discourse Analysis: Conversation Analysis and Speech Act Theory, 2014. It discussed two approaches to discourse analysis: conversation analysis, speech act theory on the ground of pointing out their similar aspects as well as their contrasting features. CA and speech act theory, in fact, it is very useful devices for language users to analyze and apply techniques in spoken interactions that they encounter everyday, particularly in educational setting.Teachers study a variety of approaches to discourse, then, helping their learners to have full awareness of conversational techniques or strategies to interpret/ speaker's intention. All approaches to discourse analysis have their strengths and weaknesses. However, it is creative and challenging for analyst to balance the three ends by

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[19]D. Scott Appling, Erica J. Briscoe, Heather Hayes, and Rudolph L. Mappus, Towards Automated Personality Identification Using Speech Acts, Georgia Tech Research Institute, Atlanta, GA {scott.appling,erica.briscoe,heather.hayes,chip.mappus}@gtri.gatech.edu

making use of the disadvantages of one approach and turning them into advantages of another.[20]

Jacques Moeschler, Speech act theory and the analysis of conversations. Sequencing and interpretation in pragmatic theory. In this paper, the researcher have tried to show how speech act theory could be extended to the analysis of conversations. The researcher have argued that one of the possible extensions, which belongs to discourse analysis, makes different predictions on conversation than speech act theory, and that the meaning of speech actchanges: starting as a unit of communication, it becomes a unit of discourse. Discourse analysis leads to specific problems, that is, the interpretation and the sequencing problems. The researcher have discussed the classical solutions within discourse analysis and illocutionary logic, arguing that both approaches meet the same type of objections. Finally the researcher have defended a non discourse-based solution for the sequencing problem within Relevance theory and proposed a solution within the same framework for theinterpretation problem, and more specifically for indirect speech acts and conversational implicatures.[21]

G.   Theoretical Framework

a. Austin's Speech Act

In this study, researchers used the speech act theory of Austin. Austin distinguishes between five classes all performative speech act can be classified

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[20] Nguyen Van Han, Contrast and Critique of Two Approaches to Discourse Analysis: Conversation Analysis and Speech Act Theory, Advances in Language and LiteraryStudies ISSN: 2203-4714 Vol. 5 No. 4; August 2014.

[21] Jacques Moeschler, Speech act theory and the analysis of conversations. Sequencing and interpretation in pragmatic theory, Department of Linguistics University of Geneva

according to what uttering action intended to achieve. Austin suggests these classes with the caveat that some classifications can be applied in the future but we have to understand about the theory that does not change the meaning.[22]

a. Verdictives: An utterance that gives a finding 'as to something'. The content of a verdict can be viewed as being either true or false; but the verdict in and of itself can only be viewed as being felicitous or infelicitous after ithas been pronounced regardless of truths.

b. Exercitives: The illocutionary act of exercising power or influence. Good examplesof which would be ordering, appointing, and such. An exercitive is a pronouncement thatsomething is to be so or "giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course ofaction".

c. Commissives: These are utterances which commit the speaker to a certainundertaking or action; utterance which asserts an obligation on part of the speaker.Promises and other declarations of intent are prime examples of commissives.

d. Behabitives: This class includes aspects of social behaviour like congratulating,apologizing, insulting, and greetings.

e. Expositives

acts of expounding of views, conducting of arguments, and clarifying, e.g., deny, inform, concede, refer. Clarify reasons the way utterances fit the proceedings of conversation or arguments, communication.

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[22]LofturÁrniBjörgvinsson, Speech Act Theory, Maí 2011

b. Searle Felicity Condition

He also argues that each type of illocutionary acts requires certain expected or appropriate conditions called felicity conditions. These conditions relate to the beliefs and attitudes of the speaker and hearer and to their mutual understanding of the use of the linguistic devices for communication. He identifies four kinds of felicity conditions as follows:[23]

1. Preparation conditions: the person performing the speech act has to have quality to do so. Such verbs as baptize, arrest can be usedonly by qualified people.

2. Sincerity conditions: the speech act must be performed in a sincere manner. Verbs such as apologize, guarantee and vow are effective only if speakers mean what they say.

3. Propositional content conditions: the utterance must have exact content; e.g. for awarning, the context of the utterance must be abouta future event.

4. Essential conditions: the speech act has to be executed in the correct manner. For example, by the act of uttering a promise, the speakers intends to create an obligation to carry out the action as promised.

If the felicity conditions on requests as speech acts are also truth conditions, of both the performative and non-performative uses of the verb request and instances of request should entail propositions representing truth conditions.

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[23]Luan Van, Speech Act theory

c. Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices' (IFIDS)

Searle and Vanderveken often speak about what they call 'illocutionary force indicating devices' (IFIDs). These are supposed to be elements, or aspects of linguistic devices which indicate that the utterance is made with a certain illocutionary force, or else that it constitutes the performance of a certain illocutionary act. In English, for example, the interrogative mood is supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a question; the directive mood indicates that the utterance is (intended as) a directive illocutionary act (an order, a request, etc.); the words "I promise" are supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a promise. Possible IFIDs in English include: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs.illocutionary force indicating device (IFID) • performative verbs (predict, promise, warn) • sometimes less explicit, sometimes its stress, sometimes low voice for warnings etc.[24]

Any element of a natural language which can be literally used to indicate that an utterance of a sentence containing that element has a certain illocutionary force or range of illocutionary forces we will call an illocutionary force indicating device. Some examples of illocutionary force indicating devices are word order and mood as in: (i) "Will you leave the room?", (2) "You, leave the room!", (3) "You will leave the room", (4) "If only you would leave the room!" In each of these examples, there is some syntactical feature which, given the rest of the sentence and a certain context of utterance, expresses an illocutionary force F, and

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[24] John R. Searleand Daniel Vanderveken, SPEECH ACTS AND ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC, University of California, Berkeley University of Qu´ebec, Trois-Rivi`eres

some syntactical feature p which, given the rest of the sentence and a context of utterance, expresses a propositional content. There is a rule to the effect that the IFID should only be uttered if that felicity condition is satisfied. Illocutionary logic studies the properties of illocutionary forces (e.g. assertion, conjecture, promise) without worrying about the various ways that these are realized in the syntax of English ("assert", "state", "claim", and the indicative mood, to mention just a few for assertion).[25]

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[25]Ibid